The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy by Anzivino, Ralph C.
Marquette Law Review 
Volume 102 
Issue 3 Spring 2019 Article 5 
Spring 3-1-2019 
The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy 
Ralph C. Anzivino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, Social Welfare Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Ralph C. Anzivino, The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 747 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol102/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu. 
ANZIVINO, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019 9:25 AM 
 
THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
RALPH C. ANZIVINO* 
Across the country, lawyers have searched for the magic formula to draft 
an exculpatory contract that would successfully exculpate their client in the 
event someone was injured while participating in a recreational activity 
sponsored by the client.  Some examples of events would include snow skiing, 
swimming at a guest-only pool, horseback riding, white-water rafting, 
camping, running in a marathon, visiting a haunted house at Halloween, or a 
myriad of other events.  The uniform standard by which the enforceability of 
these exculpatory clauses is measured is whether the exculpatory contract is 
against public policy.   
The public policy of any state can be discerned by examining the various 
statutes passed by the legislature in that particular state.  Many states have 
passed laws that provide immunity from civil liability for the sponsor of various 
recreational activities provided the sponsor complies with enumerated 
statutory requirements.  This Article examines all the recreational statutes 
enacted in Wisconsin to discern Wisconsin’s public policy on the enforceability 
of exculpatory contracts.   
The legislature has made clear that absent an overriding public purpose 
(opening up one’s land for free public use) the legislature is loath to grant civil 
immunity for a sponsor’s negligent conduct that causes injury to another.  The 
public policy of tort law to provide just compensation to one who has been 
injured supersedes the contract principle of the party’s freedom of contract.  
However, even though the public policy is not to permit exculpation for a 
sponsor’s negligence, it is equally clear that the legislature does permit 
exculpation for the inherent risks in that activity.  Therefore, the primary task 
of the lawyer in drafting an enforceable exculpatory contract is to clearly 
specify in the contract those risks inherent to the activity and be able to prove 





* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.  I would like to thank Ms. Rachel Scott for her 
excellent research, insights, and valuable contributions in the making of this Article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An exculpatory contract is one that permits a contracting party to relieve 
one’s self from liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided seven cases on the enforceability of 
exculpatory contracts where personal injury was involved, and none of the 
exculpatory contracts have been upheld.  The court has indicated that the 
germane analysis in deciding on the enforceability of exculpatory contracts is 
public policy.  The public policy debate involves balancing the contract 
principle of freedom of contract versus the tort principle that one should be held 
accountable for one’s negligent conduct.   
By definition, the legislature is the preeminent source of public policy.  The 
Wisconsin legislature has passed a number of statutes providing immunity from 
civil liability, provided one complies with the statutory mandates.  The statutory 
areas where civil immunity has been provided are alpine sports, equine 
activities, camping, agricultural tourism, sport shooting, and of course, the 
recreational immunity statute.  Since the immunity statutes were in large part 
passed after the court had struck down all of the exculpatory contract cases that 
came before it, it is instructive to compare the principles established by the 
court with the principles established by the legislature.   
Exculpatory contracts are a very difficult and problematic area for lawyers.  
Lawyers continue to search for the means to create an enforceable one.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions offer clues but not solutions.  Rather, the 
legislature has shone the way.  Based on an analysis of the legislature’s 
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pronouncements on public policy and immunity from civil liability, the answers 
can be found.  The purpose of this Article is to indicate the means by which a 
lawyer can create an enforceable exculpatory contract.   
II. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT  
An exculpatory contract is defined as a contract that “relieve[s] a party from 
liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence.”1  Courts have broadly 
construed the concept of what constitutes an exculpatory contract.  For 
example, in Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone 
Co.,2 a drapery business brought an action against a telephone company for 
negligent omission of its corporate name from the telephone company’s 
“yellow pages” advertisement.  In the advertising contract between the parties, 
there was a clause that provided that the telephone company was not liable for 
errors or omissions beyond the cost of the advertisement.3  The telephone 
company argued that the contract clause was a limited liability provision, and 
not an exculpatory contract.4  The court concluded the clause was an 
exculpatory contract.5  The court reasoned that “for the telephone company to 
[be able to] return the charges, which were not earned due to its negligent 
breach of the contract, [would ignore] the resulting injury to the customer 
caused by its negligent or tortious act in not publishing the advertisement for 
which the customer had contracted.”6  As a result, the court concluded that the 
clause was not a limiting clause but, rather, the clause “made the contract an 
exculpatory one in its nature.”7 
Despite indicating that exculpatory contracts in recreational settings8 are 
not automatically unenforceable, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never 
upheld one, albeit they have had numerous opportunities to do so.9  The court 
has indicated on a number of occasions that the germane analysis to determine 
 
1. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 321 N.W.2d 173, 176 (1982). 
2. 117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984). 
3. Id. at 589. 
4. Id. at 590. 
5. Id. at 591.  
6. Id. at 590–91. 
7. Id. 
8. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); Yauger v. Skiing 
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81, 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1996). 
9. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. 
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 
76; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1007; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991); 
Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten v. 
Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982); Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 587. 
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whether an exculpatory contract is enforceable is a public policy analysis.10  In 
other words, Is it good public policy to permit an enterprise engaged in a 
recreational activity to be able to exculpate itself through its contract for its 
negligence while sponsoring that recreational activity?  That is one of the 
questions this Article intends to answer.  
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS USE TO RENDER CONTRACTS UNENFORCEABLE 
Public policy is a very broad, but not easily defined concept.11  It is said to 
embody the community common sense and common conscience.12  As a legal 
proposition, public policy is generally defined as “the collective rules, 
principles, or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth 
or . . . promote the general good.”13  More specifically, it is the “principles and 
standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental 
concern to the state and the whole of society.”14  In our tripartite nature of 
government, the legislative branch sets the public policy, the executive branch  
administers the public policy, and the judicial branch interprets the public 
policy enactments.15  The courts have stated that the wisdom and vision of our 
founders “enabled them to see the setting of public policy [w]as most 
satisfactorily and democratically accomplishable by the legislative branch.”16 
Public policy is concerned with matters of substance that relate to the public 
welfare.17  Public policy is that principle of law under which freedom of 
contract or private dealings are sometimes restricted by law for the good of the 
community.18  “In general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will 
enforce their agreements without passing on [the merits].  Sometimes, however, 
a court will decide that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by 
some overriding interest of society and will refuse to enforce [the contract] on 
grounds of public policy.”19  The decision in each particular case turns on the 
 
10. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86; Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13. 
11. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595. 
12. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595. 
13. Public Policy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
14. Id. 
15. Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 867, 236 N.W.2d 1, 16–17 (1975) (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, as to legislative powers; art. II, as to executive powers; and art. III, as to judicial powers). 
16. Id. 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 5, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
18. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Disc. Fabric House 
of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 595–96, 345 N.W.2d 417, 421 (1984). 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 5, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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delicate balance of freedom of contract versus some other conflicting public 
policy consideration.20  
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY CONFLICT ON EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS 
The laws of contracts and torts serve different purposes.  The law of 
contracts is based on the principle of freedom of contract in that contracting 
parties should be able to govern their own affairs without governmental 
interference.  The courts should protect these contracting parties by ensuring 
that each party receives the benefit of his or her bargain.  In essence, contract 
law was created to protect each party’s justifiable expectations and honor the 
security of the transaction.21  Following this principle, exculpatory agreements 
should be enforceable. 
The law of torts is directed toward compensation of individuals for injuries 
sustained as the result of another’s unreasonable conduct.  In addition, tort law 
“serves the ‘prophylactic’ purpose of preventing future harm” in that the 
payment of damages provides a strong incentive for potential future tortfeasors 
not to engage in the same conduct.22  Adherence to principles of tort law tend 
to make a court reluctant to allow parties to shift by contract the burden of 
negligent conduct from the negligent actor to the innocent victim.  Following 
this principle, exculpatory agreements should be unenforceable.  
Courts often have great difficulty when adjudicating cases dealing with 
exculpatory contracts.  The germane analysis in determining whether an 
exculpatory contract is enforceable is public policy.23  When reviewing an 
exculpatory agreement for violation of public policy, the court attempts to 
accommodate the tension between the principles of contract and tort law that 
are inherent in such an agreement.  As a result, “[e]xculpatory contracts are not 
favored by the law because they tend to allow conduct below the acceptable 
standard of care applicable to the activity.”24  On the other hand, exculpatory 




21. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 205. 
22. Id. at 211–12. 
23. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996); Roberts v. 
T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. Swimwest Family 
Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334. 
24. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); Yauger, 206 
Wis. 2d at 81. 
25. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 81. 
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V. CURRENT LAW ON A CONTRACT EXCULPATING FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
A.  Restatement of Contracts (2d) 
The Restatement of Contracts (2d) provides three circumstances where a 
term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.26  The first is where the term 
exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of 
his employment.27  An employer should not be permitted to exempt himself 
from liability to his employee for negligently causing the employee’s injury.28  
Rather, this is the province of worker’s compensation law.29  The second is 
where a term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability 
to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty.30  
For example, a common carrier or a public utility that undertakes to perform a 
public service for compensation should not be permitted to exempt itself from 
liability to the one being served for negligent breach of that duty.31  Finally, the 
last circumstance would be where the other party is a member of a class 
protected against the class to which the other party belongs.32  An example 
would be where the Court of Appeals of Colorado found an exculpatory clause 
unenforceable against a tenant after a landlord inserted an exculpatory clause 
in a lease agreement.33  It is very important to note that the Restatement 
indicates that these categories are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations 
in which exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public 
policy.34 
 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
27. Id. § 195(2)(a). 
28. Id. § 195 cmt. a. 
29. See WIS. STAT. § 102 (2017–2018)  
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
31. Id. § 195 cmt. a. 
32. Id. § 195(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
33. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. App. 1996) (“A public policy that 
protects tenants from a waiver clause is more compelling here, under a form residential lease, than it 
would be under a commercial lease.”); see also Coll. Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 
72 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 241 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1976). 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1981); Merten v. 
Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. 
Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 595–96, 345 N.W.2d 417, 421 (1984). 
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B. Wisconsin Courts 
Similar to the Restatement (2d) of Contracts, Wisconsin courts have 
identified four generic situations in which exculpatory contracts will be 
declared void on public policy grounds:  
[1] a contract arises out of a business generally thought suitable 
for public regulation; [2] the party seeking exculpation is 
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the 
public; [3] the party seeking exculpation holds itself out as 
willing to give reasonable public service to all who apply; and 
[4] the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive 
advantage of bargaining strength.35   
It is again important to note that the Wisconsin courts have concluded that 
these categories are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations in which 
exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.36   
Since 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided seven exculpatory 
contract cases where death or serious injury was involved and, in every case, 
declared the exculpatory contract unenforceable.37  The circumstances are quite 
diverse and involved the following types of activity: swimming at a members’ 
only swimming pool,38 snow skiing at a public ski hill,39 riding along with a 
spouse at work,40 race car driving at a race track,41 hot air balloon rides at a 
public event,42 water skiing at a water show,43 and horseback riding at a stable 
open to the public.44   
Despite the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never upheld an 
exculpatory contract, the court continues to insist that these exculpatory 
 
35. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 593. 
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Merten, 108 
Wis. 2d at 213; Disc. Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 595. 
37. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. 
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing 
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513 
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991); Arnold v. 
Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds 
by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten, 108 Wis. 2d 
205. 
38. Atkins, 2005 WI 4. 
39. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76. 
40. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1007. 
41. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 203, overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 
2d at 304. 
42. Roberts, 2016 WI 20. 
43. Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991). 
44. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982). 
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contracts are not automatically void and unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy.45  Rather, a court should closely examine whether such agreements 
violate public policy.46 
VI. THE LEGISLATURE’S APPROACH TO CIVIL IMMUNITY  
At the same time that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was rendering every 
recreational47 exculpatory contract that came before it unenforceable, the 
Wisconsin legislature was creating statutory immunity for enterprises that were 
conducting various recreational activities.48  Since the legislature is the 
penultimate authority that defines public policy, a review of their legislation 
and the approach utilized by the legislature in granting immunity in various 
recreational settings should suggest the means whereby immunity can be 
granted by contract in other recreational settings.  The most compelling 
question, of course, is whether the legislature, through its enactments, provides 
statutory immunity for an enterprise’s negligent conduct.  If so, there is every 
reason to believe that, if an enterprise in its contract follows the same approach 
the legislature used to provide immunity in a recreational setting, then 
contractual immunity is achievable for an enterprise’s negligent conduct.  On 
the other hand, if the legislature did not provide statutory immunity for an 
enterprise’s negligent conduct, then it seems a fair conclusion that the public 
policy of the state is not to favor granting immunity for an enterprise’s negligent 
conduct when sponsoring recreational activity.  An examination of the current 
statutes that grant immunity in various recreational settings should indicate the 
current public policy on immunity from civil liability for an enterprise’s 
negligence. 
It is an important public policy of the State of Wisconsin that enterprises 
offer recreational activities to the public.49  In this regard, Wisconsin has 
enacted three different types of statutes that are designed to decrease 
uncertainty regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result 
from participating in recreational activities.  The first type is those statutes that 
are specifically directed at a particular recreational activity and provide 
statutory immunity from civil liability to those enterprises that offer said 
recreational activity to the public.50  More specifically, statutory immunity is 
 
45. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015. 
46. Id.; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213. 
47. One exception is Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1014, which was not a recreational activity, but, 
rather involved a wife riding along with her husband while he was driving his work vehicle. 
48. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481, 895.524, 895.526, 167.33, 895.527, 895.519, 895.52 (2017–2018). 
49. Id. § 895.525(1). 
50. Id. §§ 895.481, 895.524, 895.526, 167.33, 895.527, 895.519. 
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provided for enterprises that offer the opportunity to participate in equine 
activities,51 agricultural tourism,52 alpine sports,53 sport shooting,54 and 
camping.55  The second type is a statute that provides a broad grant of statutory 
immunity to a real property owner who opens up his or her land to the public 
for non-commercial, recreational use.56  This statute is commonly known as the 
“recreational immunity statute.”57  Finally, the third type is a statute, which is 
not a statutory immunity statute, but rather an assumption of risk statute that 
specifies the responsibilities of participants in recreational activities.58   
A. Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes 
The first type of immunity statute is one that is specifically directed at a 
particular recreational activity and provides statutory immunity from civil 
liability to those enterprises that offer said recreational activity to the public.59  
Like Wisconsin, many other states’ legislatures have enacted similar statutes 
protecting equine activities,60 alpine sports,61 sport shooting;62 agricultural 
 
51. Id. § 895.481. 
52. Id. § 895.524. 
53. Id. §§ 895.526, 167.33. 
54. Id. § 895.527. 
55. Id. § 895.519. 
56. Id. § 895.52. 
57. Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, ¶ 2, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d 
329. 
58. WIS. STAT. § 895.525. 
59. Id. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524 (agricultural 
tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting). 
60. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-337 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-21-119 (2018) (statute also covers llamas); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-557p, 52-557s (2019) 
(statute also covers donkeys and mules); FLA. STAT. § 773.03 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663B-2 
(2018); IDAHO CODE § 6-1802 (2018); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15, 47/20 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-
31-5-1 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.3 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1663 (2018); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 95-11-5 (2018); MO. REV.STAT. § 537.325 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-5 (West 2019); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-4 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2305.321 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.691 (2018); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 602 (2018); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 47-9-720 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 42-11-2, -3 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-103 
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-202 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6202 (2018); W. VA. CODE 
§ 20-4-5 (2018).  
61. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-706; COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-113; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-
212; IDAHO CODE § 6-1107; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 143, § 71P (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-5, 
24:15-14; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99C-3; OR. REV. STAT. § 30.980; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-114-103; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-4-403; W. VA. CODE § 20-3A-6; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123.4 (2018). 
62. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-341; IDAHO CODE § 6-2702; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1542. 
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tourism,63 and landowner liability in the context of recreational activities.64  
Scholars have suggested that Wisconsin’s legislature act and codify more 
statutes relating to the exculpation of liability in recreational activities.65  The 
types of other activities which have drawn the attention of the legislatures in 
other states include, skating;66 motor sports;67 baseball facilities;68 hockey 
facilities;69 bowling;70 paddle sports;71 and pools, gymnasiums, places of public 
amusement, or recreation.72 
Wisconsin’s alpine sports statute and equine activity statutes were passed 
after the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether particular exculpatory 
contracts were enforceable in skiing and horseback riding cases.73  In both 
cases, the court determined that the exculpatory contracts were unenforceable 
as contrary to public policy.74  Subsequently, however, the legislature passed 
statutes, which provide immunity from civil liability in alpine sports and equine 
activities.  It is instructive to examine how the legislature created statutory 
immunity and balanced the public policy concerns after the Supreme Court held 
such contractual immunity unenforceable.   
The first case involves an eleven-year-old girl who was skiing and crashed 
into the concrete base of a lift tower.75  Upon entering the ski resort, her father 
 
63. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-347; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-121; HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54; 
IDAHO CODE § 6-3004; IND. CODE §§ 34-31-9-10, 34-31-11.4-2; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.5; ME. 
STAT. tit. 7, § 252 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 604A.40 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-31; OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.673; TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-39-102; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75A.002 (2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-512; VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6401.  
64. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-345; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557f, g; FLA. STAT. § 773.05; KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5109; MINN. STAT. § 604A.23; MO. 
REV. STAT. § 537.346; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38A-4; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.181; TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-14-201. 
65. E.g., Blake A. Nold, Comment, Codify This: Exculpatory Contracts in Wisconsin 
Recreational Businesses, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 573 (2017).  
66. ALA. CODE § 6-5-342; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 72/25 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-31-6.5-4; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 99E-13; S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-21-50 (2018). 
67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-556 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 549.09; HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
10.95; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.4. 
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-120; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
38/10. 
69. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 52/10. 
70. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 41/15; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1584 (2018).  
71. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.327 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-5 (2018).  
72. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 2018). 
73. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982); Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 
206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481, .526 (2017–2018). 
74. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 206–07; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 78. 
75. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 79. 
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had signed an exculpatory contract for the entire family.76  There were several 
reasons why the court found the exculpatory contract to be against public 
policy.  First, the court noted that an exculpatory contract must “clearly, 
unambiguously, and unmistakably” inform the signer that the waiver exculpates 
negligence.77  Second, the exculpatory contract must define and notify the 
signer of the inherent risks in the activity.78  Lastly, the owner must “clearly 
and unequivocally communicate to the signer the nature and significance of the 
document being signed.”79  In other words, not only must the exculpation be 
clear and unequivocal, but it also must be conspicuous to the signer.  The 
exculpatory contract for the skiing accident failed in all three regards.80   
As noted, Wisconsin passed a limitation of liability statute for participation 
in alpine sports after the aforementioned skiing case.81  The statute takes a three-
pronged approach to protecting the ski operator by limiting civil liability, 
specifying various assumptions of risk by the participants, and placing certain 
responsibilities on the participant.82  First, the statute limits civil liability by 
providing that a ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties as specified by 
the statute83 owes no further duty of care to a participant and is not liable for 
any injury or death that occurs as a result of any conditions or risks associated 
with alpine sports.84  The conditions and risks of alpine sports are defined by 
the statute to include “[c]hanges in weather or visibility”;85 “[t]he presence of 
surface or sub surface conditions,” such as ice, slush, mud, rocks, puddles, and 
forest growth, or debris, including stumps, logs, or brush, among others;86 
“[r]idges, sharp corners, bumps, moguls, valleys, . . . cliffs, ravines, and double 
fall lines”;87 “[v]ariations in the difficulty of terrain, surface conditions, or 
subsurface conditions” on the trails;88 “[t]he risk of injury or death on trails and 
terrains that fall away or drop off toward hazards”;89 “[t]he risk of collision with 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 84. 
78. Id. at 84–85. 
79. Id. at 86–87. 
80. Id. at 88–89. 
81. WIS. STAT. § 895.526 (2017–2018). 
82. Id.  
83. Id. § 167.33(3)?(4). 
84. Id. § 895.526(4)(a). 
85. Id. § 167.33(2)(a). 
86. Id. § 167.33(2)(b). 
87. Id. § 167.33(2)(c). 
88. Id. § 167.33(2)(d). 
89. Id. § 167.33(2)(e). 
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other participants, employees of a ski area operator, or ski area infrastructure”;90 
“[v]ariation in the location, construction, configuration, or steepness of trails or 
terrains”;91 and finally, “[t]he greater risk of collision, injury, or death in treed 
areas, in areas where competitions are held, and in areas of freestyle terrain.”92 
The critical condition precedent that must be satisfied before the ski 
operator owes no further duty of care to a participant and is not liable for any 
injury that occurs as result of any conditions or risks associated with alpine 
sports is that the ski operator fulfills all of the duties specified by the statute.  
The statutory duties of the ski operator that must be complied with are divided 
into two categories—signage/notice93 and other duties.94  The signage/notice 
duties require the ski operator to post signs of various sizes warning the 
participants about the afore-described conditions and risks of the alpine sport;95 
recommending the wearing of helmets;96 specifying the participant’s duties;97 
assessing the difficulty of the trails;98 warning of the ski area vehicles in the 
area;99 and indicating that a copy of the alpine sports statute is available for the 
participant to read.100  “Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area is 
statutorily presumed to have seen and understood the signage provided by the 
ski area operator.”101 
The other statutory duties include a requirement that “[e]ach ski 
operator . . . post and maintain a map of the trails and terrains in the ski area”;102 
“mark hydrants, water pipes, and any other man-made structures on the ski area 
that are not readily visible to participants in an alpine sport”;103 “adopt a written 
policy determining which man-made ski area infrastructures require protective 
padding and determine the type, height, thickness, and color of the padding”;104 
 
90. Id. § 167.33(2)(f). 
91. Id. § 167.33(2)(g). 
92. Id. § 167.33(2)(h). 
93. Id. § 167.33(3). 
94. Id. § 167.33(4). 
95. Id. § 167.33(3)(a)–(b). 
96. Id. § 167.33(3)(b)(2). 
97. Id. § 167.33(3)(d)–(em). 
98. Id. § 167.33(3)(f). 
99. Id. § 167.33(3)(i). 
100. Id. § 167.33(3)(c). 
101. Id. § 895.526(2)(b). 
102. Id. § 167.33(4)(a). 
103. Id. § 167.33(4)(ag). 
104. Id. § 167.33(4)(ar). 
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and finally, follow the various statutory requirements regarding ski area 
vehicles.105  
Next, the statute addresses assumption of risk in a number of ways.  First, 
it provides that every participant in an alpine sport accepts the aforesaid 
conditions and risks of the alpine sport.106  “Second, every participant in an 
alpine sport . . . accepts that failure to wear a helmet or wearing a helmet that is 
improperly sized, fitted, or secured increases the risk of injury or death or the 
risk of a more severe injury.”107  Third, every participant in an alpine sport 
accepts that natural or man-made obstacles, “including ski area infrastructure 
and ski area vehicles, may be unpadded or not heavily padded and accepts that 
there may be a higher risk of injury or death associated with a collision with an 
obstacle that is unpadded or not heavily padded.”108 
Finally, the statute places various duties upon the participants.  The duties 
are primarily safety rules that if the participant fails to follow the rules will 
likely be evidence of contributory negligence by the participant.109  In addition, 
the statute provides that every participant in an alpine sport is responsible for 
choosing whether to wear a helmet or not while participating.110  “And, if the 
participant chooses to wear a helmet, he or she has the responsibility to ensure 
that the helmet is of the correct size and fit and to ensure that it is properly 
secured while [participating] in the alpine sport.”111 
Much can be learned from the legislature’s adoption of the alpine sports 
statute after the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Yauger concerning the 
balance between civil liability immunity and public policy.  Recall, the Yauger 
case involved an eleven-year-old girl who was skiing and crashed into the 
concrete base of a lift tower.112  There were three reasons why the Supreme 
Court found the exculpatory contract to be against public policy.  First, the court 
noted that a contract must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform 
the signer that the waiver exculpates negligence.113  However, the alpine statute 
does not exculpate for a ski operator’s negligence.  In fact, it is a condition 
precedent to civil immunity that the ski operator fulfills all of the statutory 
duties required by the statute before any immunity protection arises.114  Even 
 
105. Id. § 167.33(4)(b). 
106. Id. § 895.526(2)(a). 
107. Id. § 895.526(2)(c). 
108. Id. § 895.526(2)(d). 
109. Id. § 895.526(3)(a). 
110. Id. § 895.526(3)(b). 
111. Id. § 895.526(3)(b). 
112. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 79, 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1996). 
113. Id. at 84. 
114. WIS. STAT. § 895.526(4)(a). 
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though the statute provides that one of the conditions and risks of participating 
in an alpine sport is the risk of collision with the ski area infrastructure,115 one 
of the duties statutorily imposed upon the ski operator is that a “ski operator 
shall adopt a written policy determining which man-made ski area 
infrastructures require protective padding and determine the type, height, 
thickness, and color of the padding.”116  It would clearly be a question of fact 
for the jury to determine whether the ski operator was negligent in determining 
the type, height, thickness, and color of the padding on the concrete bases of 
the lift towers.  Another example indicating that the alpine statute does not 
exculpate for the ski operator’s negligence is the statute’s treatment of ski area 
vehicles.117  Among other statutory requirements, the alpine sports statute 
mandates that an employee operating a ski area vehicle118 must possess a valid 
driver’s license;119 that the operator of a ski area vehicle may not operate a 
vehicle “at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable”;120 and the person 
operating a ski area vehicle within the ski area during the hours in which a lift 
is being operated shall give skiers the right-of-way.121  The ski area operator’s 
failure to satisfy any of the aforesaid requirements concerning ski area vehicles 
can lead to a claim of negligence.  In sum, the ski operator is not exculpated or 
granted immunity from any acts of negligence by the alpine sports statute.   
Second, the court required that the exculpatory contract must define and 
notify the signer of the inherent risks in the activity.122  The statutory 
requirements of signage and notice clearly provide ample notice to every 
participant of all the inherent risks involved in alpine sports, including making 
available a copy of the Wisconsin alpine sports statute for their review.  Finally, 
the court required that the owner “clearly and unequivocally communicate to 
the signer the nature and significance of the document being signed.”123  Again, 
the statutory requirements of signage and notice clearly and unequivocally 
communicate to each participant that there is a limitation of liability by the ski 
operator, assumption of risk by the participants regarding the conditions and 
risks inherent in alpine sport, and also, that the participant must follow all safety 
rules to avoid injury or death to the participant or a third-party participant.   
 
115. Id. § 167.33(2)(f). 
116. Id. § 167.33(4)(ar). 
117. Id. § 167.33(4)(b). 
118. Id. § 167.33(1)(k). 
119. Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(5). 
120. Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(7). 
121. Id. § 167.33(4)(b)(8). 
122. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84–85, 557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996). 
123. Id. at 86. 
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In drafting the alpine sports statute, the legislature adopted only two of the 
three rationales for the Yauger decision.  First, the court required that the 
exculpatory contract define and notify the signer of the inherent risks in the 
activity.124  The alpine sports statute accomplishes that through its signage 
requirements of the conditions and risks of participating in alpine sports125 and 
by requiring that the ski operator offer a copy of the alpine sports statute to any 
participant.126  Second, the court required that the owner “clearly and 
unequivocally communicate to the signer the nature and significance of the 
document being signed.”127  The alpine sports statute satisfies that principle 
through its signage requirements to all participants.128  Finally, the court 
required that any exculpatory contract must use the word negligence.129  
Significantly, however, the alpine sports statute does not provide civil liability 
immunity for a ski area operator’s negligence.  In fact, there are numerous 
instances where the ski operator will be liable for its negligence under the 
statute.130  The only immunity from civil liability is for the inherent risks 
integral to participating in alpine sports, and not for the ski area operator’s 
negligence.131  This analysis is supported by the legislative history 
accompanying the adoption of the alpine sports statute where in it indicates that 
“a ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties, as described in the Act, . . . is 
not liable for any injury or death that occurs as a result of any condition or risk 
accepted by the participant.”132  In other words, the immunity runs only to the 
inherent risks in participating in the alpine sport.  
The second case involves a person who was injured while taking a 
horseback riding lesson.133  The Merten court concluded that the exculpatory 
clause violated public policy because the stable owner interjected a 
misrepresentation concerning insurance coverage into the bargaining process 
before the exculpatory contract was executed.134  After the case was decided by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin enacted a limitation of liability 
 
124. Id. at 84–85. 
125. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(2)(a), 167.33(2)–(3). 
126. Id. § 167.33(3)(c). 
127. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86. 
128. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(2)(b), 167.33(3)(c). 
129. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84. 
130. See WIS. STAT. §§ 895.526(3)(b), 167.33(1)(k), 167.33(4)(ar), 167.33(4)(b), 
167.33(4)(b)(7), 167.33(4)(b)(8). 
131. Id. § 895.526(3)(b). 
132. ANNE SAPPENFIELD, WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL ACT MEMO, 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 199, 
LIABILITY OF SKI AREA OPERATORS AND SNOW SPORT DUTIES (Apr. 13, 2012). 
133. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174 (1982). 
134. Id. at 214–15. 
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statute for equine activities.135  The statute provides that, with some exceptions, 
a person, including an equine activity sponsor136 or an equine professional,137 
“is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to his or her 
participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity 
is injured or killed as the result of an inherent risk of equine activities.”138  An 
“inherent risk of equine activities” is “a danger or condition that is an integral 
part of equine activities.”139  Those inherent risks are defined as the propensity 
of an equine to behave in an erratic manner; the “unpredictability of an equine’s 
reaction to a sound, movement or unfamiliar object, person, or animal”; “[a] 
collision with an object or another animal”; the potential for another person 
participating in an equine activity to act in a negligent fashion; or a natural 
hazard, including surface and subsurface conditions.140  Significantly, a person 
seeking immunity under the statute cannot receive immunity if the person 
provides equipment that “he or she knew or should have known was faulty and 
the faulty equipment . . . causes the injury or death”; or “[p]rovides an equine 
to a person and fails to make a reasonable effort to determine the ability of the 
person to engage in the equine activity or to safely manage the particular 
equine . . . based on the person’s representations of his or her ability”; or “fails 
to conspicuously post warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition 
known to him or her on the property.”141  Notably, the legislature has chosen to 
exculpate the owner only for the inherent risks of the activity and not for 
negligent activity by the owner.  Unfortunately, the details regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injury in Merten were not reported in 
the court’s opinions.142  Therefore, one cannot surmise whether the statute 
would have had any impact on the resolution of the case.   
Besides the two statutes that were enacted as a result of Wisconsin Supreme 
Court cases, there are three additional Wisconsin statutes that were enacted to 
provide immunity from civil liability for owner/operators that offer recreational 
activities.  One statute addresses private campgrounds;143 another covers sport 
shooting,144 and a third relates to agricultural tourism activities.145  The private 
 
135. Compare id., with 1995 Wis. Act 256. 
136. WIS. STAT. § 895.481(1)(b)(9)(c). 
137. Id. § 895.481(1)(b)(9)(d). 
138. Id. § 895.481(2). 
139. Id. § 895.481(1)(e). 
140. Id.  
141. Id. § 895.481(3). 
142. See Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206–09, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174–76 (1982). 
143. WIS. STAT. § 895.519. 
144. Id. § 895.527. 
145. Id. § 895.524. 
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campground statute provides that an owner or operator of a private campground 
and any of its employees or officers are immune from civil liability for acts or 
omissions that relate to camping at a private campground if a person is injured 
or killed or property is damaged as a result of an inherent risk of camping.146  
The inherent risks of camping are defined as a danger or condition that is an 
integral part of camping, including the dangers posed by: “[f]eatures of the 
natural world, such as trees, tree stumps, roots, rocks, mud, sand, and soil; 
[u]neven or unpredictable terrain; [n]atural bodies of water; [a]nother camper 
or visitor at the . . . campground acting in a negligent manner where the 
campground owner or employees are not involved; [a] lack of lighting, 
including lighting at campsites; [c]ampfires in a fire pit or enclosure provided 
by the campground”; or weather, insects, birds, and other wildlife.147 
Notably, there are at least two instances anticipated by the campground 
statute that would cause a private owner/operator to be responsible for its 
negligent conduct.  First, if the owner/operator fails to “conspicuously post 
warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition known to him or her on 
the property that he or she owns, leases, rents, or is otherwise in lawful control 
of or possession.”148  And, second where another camper or visitor at the private 
campground acts in a negligent manner and the campground owner or employee 
is involved.149  In sum, the owner/operator of a campground is not civilly liable 
for the “inherent risks of camping” but is responsible for his or her negligent 
conduct.   
The second statute provides immunity from civil liability for the 
owner/operator of a sport shooting range.150  The statute provides immunity 
from civil liability that relates to the noise resulting from the operation of the 
sport shooting range151 and immunity from any civil action based solely on the 
negligent act of a user of the sport shooting range.152  Arguably, if the 
owner/operator in any way contributed to the negligent act of a user of the sport 
shooting range, the owner/operator would be responsible for its negligent 
conduct.  Notably, the statute does not provide any immunity for the negligent 
conduct of the owner/operator while operating the range.  There should be no 
inherent risks of injury or death at a sport shooting range, and the statute 
understandably does not address such risks.  
 
146. Id. § 895.519(2). 
147. Id. § 895.519(1)(am).  
148. Id. § 895.519(3)(c).  
149. Id. § 895.519(1)(am)(4). 
150. Id. § 895.527. 
151. Id. § 895.527(2). 
152. Id. § 895.527(9). 
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Finally, the third statute provides immunity from civil liability for 
participation in an agricultural tourism activity.153  Agricultural tourism activity 
is an:  
educational or recreational activity that takes place on a farm, 
ranch, grove, or other place where agricultural, horticultural, 
or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish 
are raised, and that allow members of the general public, 
whether or not for a fee, to tour, explore, observe, learn about, 
participate in, or be entertained by an aspect of agricultural 
production, harvesting, or husbandry that occurs on the farm, 
ranch, grove, or other place.154   
The agricultural tourism activities statute indicates that a “provider is 
immune from civil liability for injury to or the death of an individual who is 
participating in an agricultural tourism activity on the property owned, leased, 
or managed by the agricultural tourism provider” if the participant is injured or 
killed as a result of a “risk inherent in the agricultural tourism activity” and the 
agricultural tourism provider posts and maintains a statutorily required sign in 
a clearly visible location at each entrance to the property.155  The “risks inherent 
in an agricultural tourism activity” means:  
a danger or condition that is an integral part of an agricultural 
tourism activity, including all of the following: (1) the surface 
and sub surface conditions of land and the natural condition of 
vegetation and water on the property; (2) the unpredictable 
behavior of wild, domestic, or farm animals on the property; 
(3) the ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily 
used where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops 
grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised; or, (4) the 
possibility that a participant in an agricultural tourism activity 
may act in a negligent manner, including by failing to follow 
instructions given by the agricultural tourism operator or by 
failing to exercise reasonable caution while engaging in the 
agricultural tourism activity, that may contribute to the injury 
to that participant or to another participant.156   
Notably, the statute is silent on the provider’s responsibility for negligent 
conduct.  The statute only provides immunity from civil liability for the “risks 
inherent in the agricultural tourism activity,” and not negligent conduct by the 
provider.  Thus, it seems clear that if a participant was injured by a provider’s 
 
153. Id. § 895.524. 
154. Id. § 895.524(1)(a). 
155. Id. § 895.524(2)(a). 
156. Id. § 895.524(1)(e). 
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employee improperly operating a piece of equipment, the statute will provide 
no immunity from that negligent conduct. 
B. Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute 
None of the aforesaid specific recreational immunity statutes provide 
immunity to the owner/operator for the owner/operator’s negligence that 
injures someone who is participating in the defined activity.  However, four of 
the separately defined recreational immunity statutes specifically provide that 
nothing in each individual statutory section affects the limitation of a property 
owner’s liability under Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute.157  This is 
the second type of statute, which provides a broad grant of statutory immunity 
from civil liability arising from recreational activity but is not directed at any 
particular recreational activity.  Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute is 
the only statute in Wisconsin that provides statutory immunity for an 
owner/operator’s negligence that injures a person while that person is 
participating in a recreational activity on the owner/operator’s land.158  The 
recreational activities enumerated in the statute are not exclusive, and other 
recreational activities that are substantially similar to those enumerated in the 
statute are also protected.159  Further, the legislation is to be liberally construed 
in favor of the property owner.160 
The statute protects governmental bodies,161 nonprofit organizations,162 and 
private property owners.163  The statute provides that “no owner and no officer, 
employee or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner’s 
property to engage in an recreational activity: (1) a duty to keep the property 
safe for recreational activities; (2) a duty to inspect the property . . .; or (3) a 
duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the property.”164  
An example of the application of the recreational immunity statute is Held v. 
Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc.165  In Held, the plaintiffs were on a 
snowmobile traveling on a dark trail when they collided with an abandoned trail 
grooming sled.166  Both plaintiffs suffered injuries.167  The plaintiffs brought 
 
157. Id. §§ 895.481(7), 895.519(4), 895.524(4), § 895.526(5).   
158. Id. § 895.52. 
159. 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1. 
160. Id. 
161. WIS. STAT. § 895.52(1)(d). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. § 895.52(1)(d)(2). 
164. Id. § 895.52(2). 
165. 2007 WI App 43, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730 N.W.2d 428. 
166. Id. ¶ 2. 
167. Id. 
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claims against the Ackerville Snowmobile Club, alleging it had “negligently 
maintained the grooming equipment, failed to move the drag from the trail, and 
failed to provide any warning of the hazard to trail users.”168  Ackerville 
answered by alleging that the negligence claims were barred by Wisconsin’s 
recreational immunity statute.169 
The trial court explained, when granting Ackerville’s motion for summary 
judgment, that the issue before the court was not whether Ackerville was 
negligent, but rather whether Ackerville enjoys statutory immunity.170  On 
appeal, the appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.171  When 
discussing the recreational immunity statute, the appeals court noted that 
“Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute recognizes ‘the dramatic shrinkage 
of the public’s access to recreational land in an increasingly crowded world’ 
and encourages landowners to open their property to the public for recreational 
use.”172  In return for opening their land to the public’s use, the legislature 
determined that the recreational users should bear the risk of the recreational 
activity, including the owner’s173 negligence.174 
The recreational immunity statute, however, has been carefully 
circumscribed so as not to grant too broad an immunity for an owner/operator’s 
negligence.  There are three significant limitations to the scope of the immunity 
granted by the statute.  First, “its stated purpose is to limit [a property owner’s] 
liability in order to encourage property owners to open their land to the 
public.”175  None of the cases interpreting Wisconsin’s recreational immunity 
statute have granted immunity to a party who was not responsible for opening 
up his or her land to the public.176  “The legislature did not enact the . . . statute 
to stop landowners from engaging in negligent behavior, but to induce property 
owners to open their land for recreational use.”177  As a result, recreational users 
are to bear all the risks of the recreational activity.178  Granting immunity to a 
 
168. Id. ¶ 4. 
169. Id.  
170. Id. ¶ 5. 
171. Id. ¶ 1. 
172. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Kosky v. Int’l Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 477, 565 N.W.2d 
260 (Ct. App. 1997). 
173. Owner is a broadly defined term and included the Ackerville Snowmobile Club as an 
occupier. See id. ¶ 19. 
174. Id. ¶ 20. 
175. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492. 
176. Id. ¶ 33. 
177. Held, 2007 WI App 43, ¶ 20. 
178. Id. 
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party that does not open his or her land to the public is not supported by 
Wisconsin case law.179 
Second, the legislature intended by the statute to “limit the liability of 
property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities 
under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal 
pecuniary benefit.”180  In this regard, the statute specifically provides that it 
does not provide immunity if the private property owner “collects money, 
goods, or services in payment for the use of the owner’s property for the 
recreational activity” in an amount greater than $2,000 during the year in which 
the death or injury occurs.181  Clearly the intent of the legislature was to protect 
the owner who opens up his/her land for recreational use and not commercial 
use.   
Finally, the last limitation on the grant of immunity is that the only type of 
negligence that can be exculpated under the recreational immunity statute is 
negligence that is directly connected to the land or related to the condition or 
maintenance of the land.182  If the negligence does not relate to the land, there 
is no immunity; an owner’s negligence not connected to the condition or 
maintenance of the land is actionable.  For example, the allegedly negligent 
conduct of a club and its agents regarding detonation of fireworks for a public 
fireworks display was held not related to the condition or maintenance of the 
land, and thus the recreational immunity statute did not bar the volunteer’s 
lawsuit against the club and its agents for injuries sustained when he was 
cleaning a firing tube and an explosion occurred.183  Similarly, when a child 
drowned at a city pond, and it was subsequently alleged that the city’s 
paramedical services provided were negligent, it was held that “the City was 
acting independent of its functions as owner of recreational land and that its 
 
179. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 41. 
180. 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1. 
181. WIS. STAT. § 895.52(6)(a) (2017–2018). 
182. See Wilmet v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WI App 16, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 N.W.2d 251; 
Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 WI App 61, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515, rev. denied, 2016 
WI 81, 371 Wis. 2d 610, 887 N.W.2d 894; Kosky v. Int’l Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied, 215 Wis. 2d 424, 576 N.W.2d 280 (1997); Kostroski v. 
County of Marathon, 158 Wis. 2d 201, 462 N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 465 N.W.2d 656 
(Wis. 1990); Sauer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 448 N.W.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied, 
449 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1989); see also Lasky v. City of Stevens Point, 220 Wis. 2d 1, 582 N.W.2d 64 
(Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied, 585 N.W.2d 158, 220 Wis. 2d 366 (1998) (holding that plaintiff who fell 
because of a negligently maintained bridge was barred from recovery under 895.52); Verdoljak v. 
Mosinee Paper Corp., 192 Wis. 2d 235, 531 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. granted, 537 N.W.2d 
570 (Wis. 1995), aff’d, 200 Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996) (inferring that plaintiff who struck 
closed gate on property was barred from recovery based on 895.52). 
183. Kosky, 210 Wis. 2d at 476–77. 
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public paramedic services rendered were unrelated to the City’s role as owner 
of the Pond.184  The City’s immunity for its functions as owner of recreational 
land could not shelter its liability for negligently performing another 
function.”185 
It is clear that the legislature has carefully chosen the one circumstance 
where it will grant immunity for an owner/operator’s negligent conduct when 
that owner/operator is offering a recreational activity to the public.  “[T]he 
impetus for the [recreational immunity statute] is the continual shrinkage of the 
public’s access to recreational land in the ever more populated modern 
world.”186  In that one limited circumstance, the legislature has decided that it 
is good public policy to provide immunity for the property owner’s negligent 
conduct if the property owner opens up his or her land for the public’s 
recreational use.  Significantly, it is also important to note that the legislature 
has provided that once the recreational activity goes from a recreational motive 
to a commercial one, there is no longer any immunity for the property owner’s 
negligence.  Finally, the legislature has carefully limited the scope of the 
property owner’s immunity for negligent conduct by requiring that the only 
type of negligence that can be exculpated under the recreational immunity 
statute is negligence that is directly connected to the land or related to the 
condition or maintenance of the land.  These limitations indicate that the 
legislature believes it is good public policy to provide immunity for an owner’s 
negligence only when there is a greater public policy to be served, such as 
opening up private land for the public’s recreational use, not the owner’s 
commercial use. 
C. Wisconsin’s Assumption of Risk Statute for Recreational Activity 
The third type of statute that provides protection to enterprises that offer 
recreational activity opportunities is not a statutory immunity statute, but rather 
an assumption of risk statute that specifies the responsibilities of participants in 
recreational activities.187  Significantly, the statute provides that “[a] participant 
in a recreational activity engaged in on premises owned or leased by a person 
who offers facilities to the general public for participation in recreational 
activities accepts the risks inherent in the recreational activity of which the 
 
184. Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 711, 516 N.W.2d 427, 428–29 (1994). 
185. Id.  
186. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492 (quoting 
Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 489, 431 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
187. WIS. STAT. § 895.525 (2017–2018). 
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ordinary prudent person is or should be aware.”188  Further, the statute places 
certain responsibilities on each participant in a recreational activity:  
[to] act within the limits of his or her ability; [h]eed all 
warnings regarding participation in the recreational activity; 
[m]aintain control of his or her person in the equipment, 
devices, or animals the person is using while participating in 
the recreational activity; [and] [r]efrain from acting in any 
manner that may cause or contribute to the death or injury to 
himself or herself or to other persons while participating in the 
recreational activity.189 
VII. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE 
The germane analysis to determine whether an exculpatory contract is 
enforceable is public policy.190  Since 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
decided seven exculpatory contract cases where death or serious injury was 
involved,191 and in five of those cases the court concluded that each exculpatory 
contract violated public policy.192  Prior to public policy being the germane 
analysis, the court used contract principles to determine the validity of 
exculpatory contracts.193  Since the legislature is the penultimate arbitrator of 
public policy, an analysis of the legislature’s enactments on statutory immunity 
or exculpation provides insight and guidance on the public policy of the State 
when addressing immunity (exculpation) for enterprises that offer recreational 
opportunities to the public. 
Wisconsin has enacted seven statutes, in total, that are designed to protect 
owner/operators who provide recreational activities to the public.194  Five of 
those seven statutes are designed to protect owners/operators who are providing 
 
188. Id. § 895.525(3). 
189. Id. § 895.525(4)(a)(1)–(4). 
190. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996); Roberts, 
2016 WI 20, ¶ 49; Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 
N.W.2d 334. 
191. Roberts, 2016 WI 20; Atkins, 2005 WI 4; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76; Richards v. Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 
(1982); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. 
Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms 
v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
192. Roberts, 2016 WI 20; Atkins, 2005 WI 4; Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 76; Richards, 181 Wis. 
2d at 1007; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 215. 
193. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 502; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 203, overruled on other grounds 
by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 304. 
194. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524 
(agricultural tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting), 895.52, (recreational 
immunity), 895.525 (assumption of risk by participant). 
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specifically targeted recreational activities to the public.195  The protection is 
afforded by providing immunity from civil liability under specified 
circumstances.196  None of the five specifically targeted immunity statutes 
provides immunity from the owner/operator’s negligent conduct.197  On the 
other hand, the recreational immunity statute198 does provide immunity for the 
landowner’s negligence if a person is injured on the landowner’s land.199  And 
finally, the assumption of risk statute200 does not address immunity, but rather 
provides that the participant assumes the inherent risks of participating in that  
recreational activity.201 
The public policy on exculpatory contracts is fairly discernable from an 
analysis of the seven statutes that were designed to protect owner/operators who 
provide recreational activities to the public.  The legislature has made it very 
clear that it is not the public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator 
from its negligence when providing opportunities for the public to participate 
in recreational activities.  The only exception to that conclusion is where the 
legislature has provided immunity from an owner’s negligence in the 
recreational immunity statute.  And of course that is easily understandable by 
the fact that the legislature has made the public policy decision to encourage 
landowners to open up their private land for the public’s use and in return has 
provided immunity from the landowner’s negligence should that occur.202  The 
legislature has made the policy decision that it is more important to open up 
private land to the public than to compensate an individual for the landowner’s 
negligence.203  This immunity protection, however, does not extend to 
malicious conduct by the landowner.204  The principle that it is not the public 
policy of Wisconsin to provide immunity for an owner/operator’s negligent 
conduct when offering a recreational activity to the public comports with the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which indicated, when balancing the conflicting 
principles of contract and tort law: “Under the circumstances in the case at bar, 
 
195. Id. §§ 895.481 (equine activities), 895.519 (private campgrounds), 895.524 (agricultural 
tourism activity), 895.526 (alpine sports), 895.527 (sport shooting). 
196. Id. 
197. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra pp. 755–65. 
198. WIS. STAT. § 895.52. 
199. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69. 
200. WIS. STAT. § 895.525. 
201. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Assumption of Risk Statute for Recreational Activity, supra p. 
769. 
202. Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶ 20, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730 
N.W.2d 428. 
203. Id.  
204. WIS. STAT. § 895.52(6)(b-c). 
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a combination of these factors demonstrates that adherence to the principle of 
freedom of contract is not heavily favored.  The principle of tort law, to 
compensate persons for injuries resulting from unreasonable conduct of 
another, prevails.”205   
There are other factors, as well that support the conclusion that it is not 
good public policy to permit an owner/operator, who negligently injures 
another, to be able to contractually exculpate for the owner/operator’s 
unreasonable conduct.  An exculpatory contract that excuses unreasonable 
conduct will lead to more unreasonable conduct in the industry, which will, in 
turn, lead to a downward spiral of all standards in the industry.  Lower standards 
will logically lead to more injuries.  Also, the net effect of the exculpatory 
contract is to place the emotional and financial loss on the innocent participant.  
It is certainly a public policy issue whether a participant should solely bear the 
costs of providing such recreational events.206  Rather, the solution which seems 
best to comport with public policy is to require the owner/operator to provide 
insurance, which can best be used to spread the risks through the ticket prices, 
which can be adjusted to incorporate the insurance costs.207  Let the public 
decide through the marketplace if the recreational activity is worthy of their 
support.208   
VIII. THE EXCULPATORY CONTRACT AND INHERENT RISKS 
Although they do not provide immunity for negligent conduct by the 
owner/operator, all of the aforesaid specifically targeted immunity statutes, 
with the exception of the sport shooting statute, provide immunity from civil 
liability if a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational 
activity.209  Obviously, there should be no inherent risks of injury in recreational 
sport shooting.  Also, the recreational immunity statute does not address 
inherent risks.210  Each statute, with the exception of the recreational immunity 
statute, the assumption of risk statute, and the sport shooting statute, spells out 
with particularity the inherent risks in each targeted recreational activity.  The 
assumption of risk statute, however, does provide that the inherent risks of the 
recreational activity are assumed by the participant, although they are not 
 
205. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1020, 513 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1994). 
206. Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 213, 330 N.W.2d 773, 778–79 
(1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987). 
207. Id.  
208. Id. 
209. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra pp. 755–65. 
210. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69. 
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spelled out with any particularity.211  Based on the foregoing analysis of the 
recreational immunity statues, the legislature has made it very clear that it is the 
public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from civil liability 
when a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational activity.   
The phrase “inherent risk,” however, is an ambiguous term.212  For 
example, some states define an inherent risk in the skiing context as “one that 
cannot be removed through the exercise of due care if the sport is to be 
enjoyed.”213  On the other hand, other states define an inherent risk as including 
a collision with the ski lift towers.214  There does, however, seem to be 
agreement that the inherent risk for any recreational activity does not include 
the owner/operator’s negligent conduct.215   
It is an established principle that an exculpatory contract must clearly and 
unmistakably inform the signer that they are waiving particularized, identified 
claims against the other party that are within the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of contracting.216  Thus, the failure to define the inherent risks of the 
activity in an exculpatory contract will almost assuredly cause the contract to 
be rendered unenforceable.217  Also, there is a practical advantage to carefully 
describing the inherent risks in the exculpatory contract.  The common practice 
in these exculpatory contract cases is for the defense to move for summary 
judgment based on the exculpatory contract signed by the plaintiff.218  However, 
the motion for summary judgment cannot be granted if there is a genuine issue 
of material fact.219  The typical issue of material fact raised by the plaintiff, who 
is opposing the defendant’s motion, is the scope of the exculpatory contract.220  
In other words, Was the injury caused by a risk particularly described in the 
 
211. See discussion, Wisconsin’s Recreational Immunity Statute, supra pp. 765–69. 
212. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84–85, 557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996). 
213. Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705, 715 (N.J. 1996) (suggesting that any 
risk that can be obviated should be, such as paddling the lift structures on the ski hills). 
214. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.342(2) (2018). 
215. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 85 (citing Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 800 (Vt. 1995) 
(finding that a ski owner’s negligence is not an inherent risk of skiing)).   
216. Id. at 84; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 522, 468 N.W.2d 654, 661–62 (1991); 
Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 212, 330 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1983), overruled 
on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
217. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84–85. 
218. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 1, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. 
Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 1, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger, 206 Wis. 
2d at 80; Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1010, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (1994); Dobratz, 161 
Wis. 2d at 507; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 207, overruled on different grounds by Green Spring Farms, 
136 Wis. 2d at 304; Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206–07, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174–75 (1982). 
219. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(3) (2017–2018) 
220. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 212, overruled by Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 304. 
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contract?  If the risk is not particularly described, then the scope of the release 
is a jury question,221 and the motion for summary judgment will be denied.222       
Two cases illustrate the analysis when the exculpatory contract fails to 
clearly define the inherent risk in the activity.  In Hammer v. Road America, 
Inc.,223 Mr. Hammer, a professional motorcycle driver, fell off “his motorcycle 
while negotiating a turn during a race at the Road America Race Track, Elkhart 
Lake, Wisconsin.”224  When he fell off his motorcycle, he slid into a protective 
barrier along the side of the track.225  He was “severely injured and was rendered 
a paraplegic.”226  Mr. Hammer had signed an exculpatory contract before 
participating in the race.227  The defendants raised the exculpatory contract as a 
defense to the action.228  The court held that the exculpatory contract was valid 
and enforceable.229  The court noted that that Mr. Hammer was injured while 
negotiating a turn, which is “the touchstone of the sport of racing.”230  The court 
further reasoned that “[t]here was nothing about this accident that was not in 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the exculpatory agreement 
was signed.”231  Rather, Mr. Hammer “voluntarily, knowingly, and expressly 
chose to confront the risks and to bear their potential costs.”232  “No public 
policy prohibited him from doing so, and no public policy precludes [the] court 
from giving effect to his written promise not to hold the defendants responsible 
should he be overcome by the hazards of his chosen sport.”233  The court upheld 
the exculpatory contract because the injuries resulted from an inherent risk in 
the recreational activity.234  The case could have been resolved by motion had 
the inherent risk been defined in the contract.   
By comparison, in Arnold v. Shawano County Agricultural Society,235 Mr. 
Arnold brought a negligence action against the sponsor of a stock car race 
 
221. Id.  
222. Id. 
223. 614 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff’d, 793 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). 
224. Id. at 468. 
225. Id. at 471. 
226. Id. at 468. 
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
229. Id. at 472, aff’d, 793 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). 
230. Id. at 470. 
231. Id. at 471. 
232. Id. at 470. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 472. 
235. 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 
136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
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seeking damages for severe personal injuries that rendered him a 
quadriplegic.236  The injuries were sustained by Mr. Arnold while participating 
in a stock car race at the Shawano county fairgrounds.237  
The car operated by [Mr.] Arnold crashed through a guardrail, 
left the track, and then struck a utility pole and a lumber pile 
located outside of the guardrail causing a fire in the 
automobile.  As a part of the rescue operations, fire 
extinguishing chemicals were sprayed on the burning vehicle 
without removing [Mr.] Arnold from the vehicle.  The 
chemicals allegedly caused the plaintiff to sustain severe brain 
damage.238   
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the 
exculpatory contract.239  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, and ordered judgment dismissing the complaint with 
prejudice and with costs.240  On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court and remanded the case for further proceedings.241  “The court of appeals 
held the case should not be decided by a motion for summary judgment, finding 
a question of fact as to the intent of the parties in executing the release.”242  On 
the final appeal, the supreme court also found an issue of material fact and 
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for 
summary judgment.243  The supreme court could not conclude that the 
exculpatory contract was meant to cover negligent rescue operations.244  Rather, 
the supreme court believed that an issue of material fact existed as to whether 
the risk of negligent rescue operations was within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time the exculpatory contract was executed.245  The court affirmed 
the appeals court decision to remand the case to the trial court to determine if 
the injuries did or did not result from an inherent risk in the recreational 
activity.246  Importantly, the court noted that if the parties meant to include 
rescue operations, it certainly could have been written into the agreement.247  
 
236. Id. at 204. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 205. 
239. Id. at 206. 
240. Id. at 208. 
241. Id.  
242. Id. at 208–09. 
243. Id. at 212. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 215. 
247. Id. at 214. 
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These cases reinforce the concept that for many reasons, it is essential to clearly 
and carefully define the inherent risks of the activity in the exculpatory contract. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated that the germane test to 
determine whether an exculpatory contract is enforceable is public policy.  The 
legislature is the ultimate arbiter of public policy, and as such, it has enacted 
seven statutes that provide immunity from civil liability under various 
circumstances.  The statutes allocate the responsibility for a participant’s 
injuries caused by the inherent risks in the activity and the owner/operator’s 
negligence.   
The legislature has made it very clear that it is not the public policy of 
Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from its negligence when providing 
opportunities for the public to participate in recreational activities.  None of the 
statutes exculpate for negligence, with one understandable exception.  
On the other hand, all of the specifically targeted immunity statutes, with 
one understandable exception, provide immunity from civil liability if a 
participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational activity.248  In 
addition, the assumption of risk statute provides that the inherent risks of the 
recreational activity are assumed by the participant, although they are not 
spelled out with any particularity.  The legislature has again made it clear that 
it is the public policy of Wisconsin to exculpate an owner/operator from civil 
liability when a participant is injured by an inherent risk in that recreational 
activity.   
The net result of the statutory analysis is that the public policy of Wisconsin 
does not permit exculpation for an owner/operator’s negligence but does permit 
exculpation for the inherent risks in that recreational activity.  It is a common 
practice in other states to recognize this statutory distinction between 
negligence and inherent risks in exculpatory contracts.249  Finally, the concept 
of inherent risks is recognized as an ambiguous term, and, therefore, it is 
critically important to carefully describe and identify the particular inherent 




248. See discussion, Targeted Recreational Immunity Statutes, supra p. 769. 
249. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003).  The Equine Liability Act 
expresses in general terms a public policy of the legislature that equine operators should be accountable 
for injuries due to their own fault, but not for events beyond their control. Id.  
